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CHAPTER ONE
THE IMPRINT OF CULTURE
Two subjects most apt to be avoided in polite conversation are
religion and politics.

The reasons are not hard to fathom.

We express

our values and views in mixed company at the risk of exposing our
identity: perhaps also our ignorance.
avoided by a circumspect silence.

Explanations are most easily

As citizens of an increasingly

pluralistic America, we put a premium on anonymity and privacy with
. t"lons. 1
regar d t o persona l convlc

Consequently, these most public of commitments--religion and
politics--are kept most private, even secret, and guarded as
Rumpelstiltskin guarded his name.

Matters of faith tend to be consigned

to a tacit dimension of being: a Homeric netherworld of the sort once
inhabited by shades of the Greek dead.

Religion in particular is

becoming more mystic or ineffable, confirming psychologically a dualism
in our thinking that has been embraced by modern philosophy.

Ludwig

Wittgenstein concluded his Tractatus on this rather diffident note:
"What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. 112

J. Glenn

Gray has characterized the abstraction of modern social life as a
consequence of its godlessness.

3

Religion and Politics
We are confronted by a twin paradox in America today: the private

14

Christian and the private citizen.

In a bygone generation, the

Christian gospel was proclaimed abroad in the land.
recognized as part of the common law.

Christianity was

Today, the proclamation is muted

and the recognition of our Christian legal tradition is indistinct, even
in the churches.

The public religiosity of an earlier era has retreated

from community life.

A malaise has settled over the civil pageantry of

this once boisterous young republic that marked time with seven league
boots.

Even the obligatory lip service paid to civic virtue by dubious

politicians and doubtful citizens has grown cold.
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Shakespeare's Brutus

suggested a diagnosis for times like ours:
When love begins to sicken and decay,
It useth an enforced ceremony.
There are no tricks in plain and simple faith:
But hollow men, like horses hot at hand,
Make gallant show and promise of their mettle;
But when they should endure the bloody spur,
They fall their cr5sts, and, like deceitful jades,
Sink in the trial.
We live in an age of transition.

Sporadic church attendance and

low voter turnouts each express a growing disdain for any sort of
confessionalism or civic obligation.
philosophy held court,
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Where once a confident public

a strident skepticism has displaced the fairly

broad moral consensus that, according to James Hitchcock, prevailed
"until sometime after 1960."
While there were inevitable disagreements over values, in
retrospect these seem to have been relatively minor in scope,
occurring within an accepted framework of belief. To cite one
particularly sensitive example, the nation was overwhelmingly
family-oriented. Hence there was general agreement about the
undesirability of divorce, unmarried cohabitation, homosexuality,
and other practices. However common they may had been in
actuality, there was little inclination to defend them in theory.
Agencies of public expression, like the schools and 7he mass media,
tended overwhelmingly to honor this moral consensus.
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Indeed, this consensus was securely established within our legal
system, despite some signs of fraying at the edges even before the
1960s.

A radical shattering of this outwardly Christian set of

expectations scarcely could have been anticipated.

The current

fragmentation of values is being viewed positively within what Hitchcock
calls the "new pluralism" as a means to effect the transition from one
orthodoxy to another.
While the call for "pluralism" is ostensibly merely a call for
tolerance--a request that the reigning orthodoxy make room for
newer "points of view"--in practice an orthodoxy which loses its
authority has trouble even retaining the right of toleration.
Although it is still extended bare legal toleration, in practice it
finds itself more and more on the gefensive, its very right to
exist challenged in numerous ways.
The bedrock of this older orthodoxy was an accommodation between
church and state designed to maintain standards of law and morality
based on Christianity.

The disestablishment of the state churches

appears to have been originally intended to strengthen rather than
impair the cooperation between church and state as institutions.

This

is attested by numerous court rulings, including the decision of the
Supreme Court of New York in the case of People v. Ruggles, 8 Johnson
296' 297 ( 1811 ) :
Though the constitution has discarded religious establishments, it
does not forbid judicial cognisance of those offences against
religj_on and morality which have no reference to any such
establishment, or to any particular form of government, but are
punishable because they strike at the root of moral obligation and
weaken the security of the social ties . . . . The legislative
expostion of the constitution is conformable to this view of it.
Here the Court noted that "the people of this state, in common with the
people of this country, profess the general doctrines of christianity as
the rule of their faith and practice . . . . " 9

While it is true that the
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political system did not base itself upon a particular doctrinal
statement, it was predominantly Christian in its legal assumptions,
. .
mora l val ues, an d re l lglous
sympa th.les. 10
But today there is strong evidence of a growing separation of the
American legal and political system as a whole from its original,
basically Christian presuppositions, raising questions of both a
theoretical and practical nature concerning its direction.
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The object

of this study is to analyze and evaluate the implications of current
public policy concerning the relationship of church and state and to do
so in the context of a Christian philosophy of history, law, and
government.
Church, State, and Sovereignty
The central questions of philosophy often lie at the frontiers of
several disciplines.

The problem of delineating the proper spheres of

church and state, for instance, raises issues of great consequence in
the fields of law, theology, political theory, and economics.

The

institutional conflicts between church and state nevertheless point to
an even more fundamental question about the proper source of authority
to which each may appeal: Who or what wields ultimate power in society?
This is the question of sovereignty.
resort?

Where does the buck stop?

It asks: What is the court of last
The answers of philosophers and

statesmen throughout history have been varied and often irreconcilable:
the polis, the people, the king, the constitution, the church, humanity,
destiny, and God.

For our purposes here, the options ultimately boil

down to two: God or Caesar.
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Our American forebears were faced with the delicate task of
founding and properly outfitting a new system of government that would
distribute authority, protect liberty, and simultaneously guard against
the abuses of both.

By the time of the Declaration of Independence, the

concept of legal sovereignty that had for so long been claimed by kings
and parliaments was thoroughly discredited.

13

It is noteworthy that the

Constitution does not even use the word sovereignty and, instead,
reserves for itself the more modest status of "supreme law of the land,"
a concept that may be traced back to the Bible through the Magna
Carta.
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The founders recognized that ultimate authority must be

located at a point beyond human intervention and, hence, beyond
politics.

Noah Webster expressed a Christian understanding of

sovereignty when he illustrated the word in his definition: "Absolute
sovereignty belongs to God only. 1115

Without this common understanding,

the question of who wields ultimate power necessarily becomes the
supreme object of political contention.
The constitutional protection of the church from intervention by
the state is a revolutionary idea.

From the earliest days of the

church, monarchs had often claimed authoritative powers in matters of
church doctrine and government.

The authority of the Roman emperor as

the supreme pontiff over the state religion was maintained to some
degree even after the empire became nominally Christian.

During the

centuries that followed, emperors, popes, and kings fought to possess
the keys to the kingdom of God.

The American historian, Sanford H.

Cobb, could thus remark with some justification that, in light of the
long history of political absolutism, "this pure religious liberty may
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be justly rated as the great gift of America to civilization and the
world.

!116

Although Americans tend to take this gift for granted

today, the proper juxtaposition of church and state is still an
unsettled question.
Some measure of political divisiveness is to be expected when the
place of the church in society is discussed because it involves the
issue of ultimate allegiance.
in~titutions,

With the secularization of our cultural

people's expectations about the interaction of church and

state have changed.
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Many Americans now regard the church as an

unrepresentative special interest group and thus expect it to play a
subordinate, even invisible, role in public affairs.

This attitude is

probably nearly as prevalent among church members as among non-members.
Pluralism is frequently prescribed as an antidote to the
divisiveness of religious orthodoxies and enjoys a favorable image as a
common denominator or neutral value.
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According to Sidney Mead, it was

the pluralist vision of a "cosmopolitan, inclusive, universal theology"
that guided the founders. 19

Similarly, it was an avowedly nonsectarian

Christian moralism rather than religious skepticism that motivated
Horace Mann and other supporters of the public education movement early
in the nineteenth century.
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But

no~

that religion is generally

considered to be a private affair, the church as an institution is today
being relegated to the fringes of an avowedly pluralistic secular
society.

In his study of the phenomenon of revolution during the last

thousand years of western history, Euger. Rosenstock-Huessy detected a
gradual reversal in the identity of the public and private realms:
Church and economy have changed their places during the last
thousand years . . . . The universal church becomes more and more
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particular in her operations; economy becomes more and more
universally organized. We still pray for One Catholic Church. The
real trouble of the future will be, whether we can pray for it
sincerely or not. It is true that for ten centuries the nations
carried both yisions, the vision of local rights and private
property, and the vision of a universal realm of peace. Private
property is being attacked today on the same ground as the unity of
faith. Both ideals are imperilled. Bolshevism is radical enough
to make the church a private affair for the individual, and
property the public affair of the community. But the question is
not dependent on any subjective theory about Marxism. It is an
issue for any government which subsidizes industry, taxes private
educational institutions, propagates political ideas, or
repopulates fts deserted villages with self-subsisting
2
homesteads.
Indeed, some secularists nurture a hope that the church will eventually
die of sheer irrelevance if left alone and unacknowledged.
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Ironically, the problem of reconciling the claims of church and
state may be a more urgent one for a nominally secular society than for
one in which religion officially plays a leading civic role.

In the

days when sovereignty was regarded as a transcendent concept, church and
state at least had a common religious reference and a common source of
appeal in Scripture, even though they may have competed for control of
the civil sword from time to time.
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Now that sovereignty has been

brought down to earth in the name of the people, there is good reason to
doubt that any institution remains sufficiently independent of the state
to guarantee freedom of religion, or any other freedom, beyond the
merest "considerations of what is expedient for the community
l' t se lf . n
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The business of determining "community standards" is inherently
moral or religious in nature.

Indeed, morality is just as readily

legislated as it is preached or taught.

If, in fact, religiosity and

morality are basic human traits, secularity and amorality are not their
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opposites.

The rejection of one system of values and beliefs only

indicates that it has been replaced by another system considered more
acceptable, believable, or valuable.

If the really salient issue were

the establishment of religion, what would be gained by a community if,
in disestablishing the church, it simply established the state in its
place?
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When the state itself is sovereign, what institution is

sufficiently independent to stand apart from the state as a court of
last resort fully equipped to assure civil and religious liberty?

This

is the dilemma posed by any establishment of religion by the state.
This is not to deny that disestablishment has created its share of
difficulties.

Even though Christianity still outwardly prevails as the

majority religion, our accustomed religious liberty has furnished a rich
soil for doctrinal innovations.

Otto Scott's analysis suggests some of

the perplexities that confront historians as they interpret the nature
of American religion:
The United States was a government whose constitution claimed no
higher authority than its own laws. That was essentially a lawyer's
concept of civilization, and could be traced not to the church, but
to Roman tradition. The novelty of a nation without an official
religion was not fully appreciated in 1830--for no land was as
crowded with churches and no people more prone to use religious
terminology and Christian references in everyday speech, in their
writings, and in their thinking, than the Americans. There was no
question of the piety of millions. There was equally little doubt
that they did not fully realize that a land with no religious
26
center is a land where religion is what anyone chooses to claim.
The varieties of religious expression are paralleled by the
seemingly endless permutations to public law that attempt to accommodate
them.

No cultural vacuum remains unfilled for very long.

The retreat

of the church from many of its earlier social welfare and education
commitments has been matched by the advance of the state in these same
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areas.

The one has catalyzed the other.

But the state has also come to

be regarded as a vehicle for promoting civil and religious unity and
.
l't
unlversa
l y. 27

World history is the story of successive empires that

has aspired to universal dominion in one form or another, among them
Assyria, Babylon, Persia, Greece, Rome, Islam, Germany, Mongolia, Spain,
England, France, the Axis, America, and Russia.
America has long been a prolific breeding ground for new cults.
the absence of a healthy civil religion, almost anything goes.

In

The

Harvard sociologist, Pitirim Sorokin, characterized this phenomenon as
"chaotic syncretism," which he attributed to the decomposition of an
"overripe sensate culture."
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Indeed, religious pluralism is just as

problematic in its own way as the old church establishments once were
for the American colonists.

This is most strikingly reflected in the

high level of litigation over church-state issues.

The guarantee of

religious free exercise upsets the status quo, especially once it is
accepted as a distinct value apart from its original purpose of
protecting dissenters--mainly Christian--from existing church
establishments.
Regarding matters of religious belief and practice, the state today
affects an attitude of disinterested neutrality.

In a series of

decisions, the Supreme Court has held that every government activity
must be guided by a secular purpose and have a neutral "primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion." 29

But these tests are not

as straight-forward as they might appear to be for the simple reason
that the effective spheres of political and religious activity cannot be
neatly compartmentalized.

Both politics and religion are comprehensive
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in their reach.

Above all, they are inclusive; they are first of all

inclusive even where they appear exclusive.
value-laden.

Both are unavoidably

Neither is neutral in its effects, whether these are

primary or subsidiary.

Indeed, all perception, thought, and action

begins with biases, presuppositions, or predilections.
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Whether in

theory or in practice, neither the state nor the church is apt to always
agree which are the things of God and which are the things of Caesar
(Matt. 22:21 ), if they even attempt to draw a meaningful distinction
between the secular and the sacred.
"Render

If Christian believers are to

. to all their dues" (Rom. 13:7), then some yardstick is

required to determine what is due to each.

It is a problem of

jurisdiction.
This problem of jurisdiction has been compounded by the divided
state of the church.

Public policy unavoidably differentiates among and

differently affects the perceptions and practices of different churches
and church communicants.

What may be regarded as welcome assistance by

some may be regarded as an unwelcome intrusion by others.

Some

religious traditions, like Puritanism, are militantly reformational.
Others, like the Social Gospel and liberation theology, concentrate on
the transformation of social institutions.

Anabaptists, such as the

Mennonites, generally tend toward strict separationism and political
. t.lsm. 31
qule

Others, among them Roman Catholics, seek close cooperation

between church and state.

32

Religious liberty means something very

different in each case.
Particular laws and policies burden the members of some sects more
than others.

Since class legislation is still the exception rather than
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the rule, relief is usually sought in the form of exemptions or
favorable court rulings.

But exemptions are increasingly treated as

privileges rather then immunities; and court rulings are becoming highly
unpredictable and subjective in the absence of a clear interpretative
t ra d l't'lOn. 33

General policy legislation invariably imposes hardships on

those who, for legitimate religious reasons, cannot or will not comply.
These hardships may be further aggravated by overly stringent and
sometimes quite logical renderings of the vagaries of legislative
language into administrative practice.

A simple turn of phrase or an

undefined term may inspire novel bureaucratic initiatives.

The courts

are then placed in the position of having to referee the competing
claims of government officials, private citizens, and churches.
The earlier cooperation that characterized the relationship of
church and state was followed in this century by an era of relatively
benign neglect or benevolent neutrality.

But prominent religious

leaders are now expressing their concern that the relationship is
becoming increasingly confrontational.

Numerous books and articles have

appeared lately that criticize what the authors regard as gratuitous
regulatory interference in areas formerly left to church contro1.
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Growing numbers of church members are becoming persuaded that incidents
involving licensure and certification requirements for church-operated
schools and day care facilities, demands for church records by revenue
agencies, restrictions on property use by zoning authorities, and
bureaucratic stipulations concerning the proportion of time devoted to
"religious" as opposed to "secular" activities are not simply unforeseen
by-products of more general policy changes, or unfortunate
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misunderstandings, but deliberate provocations by officials in pursuit
of hostile purposes. 35
Has the era of benign neglect of churches by the state come to an
end?

Considerable evidence suggests that the state is claiming such a

wide scope of regulatory authority that its operations increasingly
impinge upon routine church activities.

If this is true, however, it

may be due in no small part to the high premium many churches place on
an entangling partnership with the state in furthering either their own
programs or those of the state.
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cases indicate a malicious intent.

Neither does it necessarily or in all
If, in fact, the religious

institutions of our society are being brought under the effective
supervision and control of the state, their independence is perhaps
being most threatened by the logical consequences of an avowedly
beneficent purpose: that is, the equalization of economic and social
opportunities for all groups in our society.
It serves little purpose, however, to speculate about the motives
or intentions of legislators, bureaucrats, and judges.

Although

intent--where it may be determined--does help confirm the direction of
the changes, what matters in this context is the impact of the policy
changes.

Despite all the talk about secular purposes and neutral

effects, what is the object of a policy of religious pluralism--or
syncretism--if not the formation of "a more perfect union" on the basis
of some variety of universalism?

It is precisely here--in the realm of

ideology--that the concern of churches with their doctrinal integrity
and their customary immunity from state intervention in the form of
regulation or taxation may come into conflict with the state's interest
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in ideological and administrative consistency.

Exceptions admitted by

either side tend to dilute the impact of its claims to authority in its
proper sphere. 37
How then may the current state of affairs best be understood?

Have

the most important conflicts between church and state already been
resolved through a series of imperfect but generally agreeable
compromises, or are the complexities of the issues only just now coming
to the surface?
The thesis of this dissertation may be stated in terms of a
conflict of jurisdiction between church and state.

As the state extends

its operations into all areas of social life, it breaches the protective
"wall of separation" that has traditionally kept the church free of
obtrusive regulation by the civil authorities.

The widening scope of

official state activity is manifested in several ways: first, a
statutory extension of state police powers through social legislation
over what are still widely regarded as ecclesiastical and domestic
spheres of authority through social legislation; second, a restriction
or preemption of certain activities involving commerce, employment, and
social relations--whether conducted in public or in private--that were
once held to be outside the jurisdiction of the state; third, a
vitiation of the principle of religious noninterference through judicial
interpretations that divorce the "establishment" and "free exercise"
clauses of the First Amendment, and fourth, an adversary posture toward
churches being taken by many agencies of the state while pursuing their
. t.lves. 38
regu l a t ory o b Jec

As a consequence, churches are facing new

restraints on their ecclesiastical or corporate rights, immunities, and
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privileges.
A number of presuppositions underlie this thesis statement that
have influenced the manner of its investigation and elaboration.
First, religion is a comprehensive human activity that embraces all
of life, particularly the rules and values of society.

The Christian

theologian, R. J. Rushdoony, maintains that "all law is enacted morality
. . . and all morality presupposes a religion as its foundation." 39
Paul Tillich's very broad definition of religion as an "ultimate
concern," which has been cited by the Supreme Court, includes theistic,
pantheistic, and atheistic religion within its compass.
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Second, the comprehensiveness of religion means that religious
neutrality is a myth.

Francis J. Powers has written that "an attitude

of indifference or neutrality toward religion, on the part of the state,
is theologically and philosophically untenable.
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Third, the American constitutional system is essentially Christian
in its foundational character and assumptions.

Justice William 0.

Douglas acknowledged this when he wrote that "a 'religious' rite which
violates standards of Christian ethics and morality is not in the true
sense, in the constitutional sense, included within 'religion,' the
'free exercise' of which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 1142

From

the bench, he reiterated an assumption in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 313 (1952) that has frequently been stated by the Court: ''We are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."
Fourth, the legal heritage of our country is Christian at its
roots.

Sir Matthew Hale's maxim that Christianity is part of the common

law was often cited by early members of the American judiciary, both in
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their written opinions and their scholarly commentaries.

For example,

in his treatise on constitutional limitations, Chief Justice Thomas M.
Cooley of Michigan wrote:
The Christian religion was always recognized in the administration
of the common law; and so far as that law continues to be the law
of the land, the fundamental principles of that religion must
continue to E3 recognized in the same cases and to the same extent
as formerly.
What may be concluded from these observations, finally, is that
perhaps too much attention has been paid to the alleged secularization
of our political institutions and not enough to the religious and
political presuppositions that have favored such an interpretation.

In

recent years, it appears that the state has been assuming--whether
intentionally or not--the essential attributes of a church.
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Far from

pursuing a separationist course, the state has consistently attempted to
convert churches and other institutions into instruments of its own
social programs and has enlisted their cooperation or acquiescence by
the granting and withholding of favors. 45
exclusively American problem.

This is by no means an

Writing in the 1930s, Eugen

Rosenstock-Huessy depicted it as part of a universal modern trend:
The world owes it to the British Commonwealth that during the last
centuries, donations, endowments, voluntary gifts, have been the
mainspring of progress in many fields. Were it not for the right
of man to do what he liked with his property little would exist in
religion, art, science, social and medical work today. No king's
arbitrary power was allowed to interfere with a man's last will as
expressed in his testament. On the independence of 10,000 fortunes
a civilization was based that allowed for a rich variety of special
activities introduced by imaginative donors and founders. The ways
of life explored under the protection of an independent judiciary
form a social galaxy. Our modern dictators, however, are cutting
deeply into this tradition. This is achieved through progressive
taxation of inheritance or limitation of a man's right over his
property, by subsidizing institutions, like Oxford, which were
independent formerly . . . . The famous Dartmouth case which Daniel
Webster won against the State (a striking example of the
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progressive significance of the Whiggish principle) was tried only
a century ago; yet the conditions which made it possible £gr
Webster to win are rapidly vanishing, at least in Europe.
Exemptions that were designed to protect religious liberties are
now perceived in some political circles either as customary privileges
which are not binding on the state or else as bargaining chips with
which to advance its policies.

The wall of separation, as it now

stands, appears to be a permeable one that simultaneously consigns
churches--often with their cheerful cooperation--to a position of
irrelevance within the contemporary American culture and enables the
state to absorb their traditional functions and prerogatives.

Indeed, a

retrospective look at the record suggests that the courts, legislatures,
and bureaucracies of the land have become involved in an experiment to
gradually disengage our political system from its dominant religious and
legal heritage. 47

Secular equivalents to religious institutions now

promote human relations, education, health, and welfare in a manner
reminiscent of William James's proposal for "a moral equivalent of
war."
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Although education has been at the center of much of the conflict
in recent years, school issues are only the most visible part of a more
fundamental clash of religious values.

Richard E. Morgan regards the

"governmentalization of welfare services" and the "educational
revolution" as the two major trigger issues that have led to a growing
conflict between church and state due to the rise of a reaction in the
1960's against "the traditional ideology of privatism."

Morgan adds:

These radical secularists tend to regard private charitable
activity as illusory and psychologically corrupting, and the notion
of religious institutions administering public funds is anathema.
Religious schools are seen as especially regressive . . . . There
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is, it should be noted, a direct conflict between the radical
secularist demand for governmentalization of social welfare and
education, and the principle of "subsidiarity" which looms large in
Catholic social thought. As formulated by Pius XI, this holds that
it is "unjust" and "gravely harmful to turn over to a greater
society . . . functions and services which can be performed by
lesser bodies . . . . " Thus families and private associations
should handle all possible functions, and nothing which they §re
4
capable of doing should be displaced "upward" to government.
At stake is who or what will define the political and social agenda
of the future.

It is a question of whose vision of the future, whose

values, whose religion will prevail.

Since church and state are so

influential in shaping public opinion, both have long been utilized as
ideological proving grounds by various social movements seeking to mold
society according to the desire of their hearts.

Possibly as a

consequence, church and state now claim overlapping spheres of
authority.

If they continue to find themselves at cross-purposes, each

may be expected to assert an independent claim--perhaps even a monopoly
of competence--over areas of that are of mutual concern.
More than any other social institution today, excepting the family,
the church derives its original identity and authority from a source
that is independent of the state. 50

The church steadfastly maintains

that it answers to a higher authority regarding its sacraments,
ceremonies, disciplines, and doctrines.
creature or appendage of the state.

Otherwise it risks becoming a

The state is equally steadfast in

upholding its immediate responsibility regarding the protection of
public health, safety, welfare, morals, and peace.

But the sphere of

its interests has grown so large that the state is again coming into
direct competition with the church and has begun asserting regulatory
control over many church activities as a sovereign right.

The concept
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of the church as a "charitable public trust," which is a holdover from
the days of established churches, has opened the door to inroads by the
state into church affairs as, for instance, in California, where the
Worldwide Church of God was temporarily placed into receivership by the
Attorney General and more than sixty churches were recently threatened
with sale for back taxes over a dispute concerning filing
.
t s. 51
requlremen
Several consequences appear to follow from the expansion of
jurisdiction and the tightening of regulations by the state: first, a
decline of civil and religious liberty in those areas of public life
where explicitly religious expression is either excluded, as in the
public school classroom and auditorium, or where it is otherwise made
unwelcome, as in the use of some public facilities for religious
gatherings and displays; 52 second, a withering away of independent
public institutions--sometimes called "mediating structures"
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--in favor

of agencies dominated, subsidized, or otherwise regulated by the state;
and third, an attitude among some public officials that may be described
54
. .
. .
.
as mlsslonary,
messlanlc,
or au th orl. t arlan.
The relationship between church and state tends to fall into one of
several categories: first, a union of church and state in which
dissenters are persecuted; second, a union of church and state in which
dissenters are tolerated; third, a separation of church and state in
which believers are persecuted; and fourth, a separation of church and
state in which religious liberty prevails. 55
not necessarily exclusive.

But these categories are

In ancient Rome, licensed religions were

tolerated and unlicensed ones were persecuted.

Historical circumstances
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have also depended on whether the state dominates the church or the
church dominates the state.

The prevalent pattern since the rise of

nation-states has been a union of church and state in which the state
dominates the church.
Historical experience--if not logic--shows religion and politics to
be inseparable.

Each is an arena for the interplay of basic beliefs

about human nature, power, and society.

Each is an expression of faith

guided by presuppositions that are never finally definitive or
indisputable. 56

But this is far from saying that faith is a blind guide

or that all answers are ultimately relative and situational.

So it may

be appropriate to reflect briefly on the practical effects of belief as
a prelude to considering the historical and ideological issues that have
shaped our understanding of church and state in contemporary America.
A Cautionary Tale
Power has only the force we are willing to attribute to it; even
the most brutal power is founded on belief. We credit it with the
ability to act at all times and everywhere, whereas, in reality it
can only act at one point and at a certain moment. In short, all
power is exactly in the position of a bank whose existence depends
on the sole probability (incidentally, very great) that all its
clients will not come at once to draw out their deposits. If,
either constantly or at a particular moment, a certain power were
summoned to bring its real force to bear in its empiST' its
strength at each point would be about equal to zero.
--Paul Valery, 1932
The medium of exchange in politics is power.

It is the all-purpose

lubricant for oiling the machinery of government and greasing the palms
of public servants.
something imaginary.

Yet, for all that, it is often regarded as
For who has ever beheld power or employed it in

its original or pure state?

All that we know of power is the
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reputation that precedes it and the results that follow.
catalyst, it cements alliances without entering into any.

Like a
Only when we

realize that "power . . . is essentially a spiritual value" do we
"glimpse into the fiduciary life of the world, founded on confidence in
man and in the future."
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But we must be careful.

Whether that confidence is well-placed or

mistaken is not itself a political question.
even more, a theological one.

It is a philosophical and,

The nature of our confidence is disclosed

on the touchstone of our "idea of man."
All politics imply a certain idea of man. In vain do we limit
political objectives, make then as simply or as crude as possible,
all politics imply a cer~~in idea of man and of the mind, and a
conception of the world.

The political essays of Paul Valery, the early hJentieth century
French poet, may be taken as an illustration.

These essays are animated

with an obvious affection for the life of the mind and the candor of an
uneasy skepticism.

Like Friedrich Nietzsche, Valery sprinkled his

transparent prose with elegant turns of phrase and sparkling epigrams,
all the while diagnosing what appeared to him as the terminal condition
of the modern intellect.

He opened his 1919 essay, "The Crisis of the

Mind," with a somber pronouncement:
too now know that we are mortal."

"We later civilizations . . . we
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So many horrors could not have been possible without so many
virtues. Doubtless, much science was needed to kill so many, to
waste so much property, annihilate so many cities in so short a
time; but moral qualities in like gymbers were also needed. Are
Knowledge and Duty, then, suspect?
The First World War had shattered faith in reason.

It was with no

little irony that Valery wrote of his idol, the intellect: "All our
language is composed of brief little dreams and the wonderful thing is
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that we sometimes make of them strangely accurate and marvellously
reasonable thought."
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Like Francisco Goya, Valery grew to believe that

"the dream of reason produces monsters."
hubris begets nemesis.

Or as the Greeks expressed it:

After the same fashion, Fyodor Dostoevsky

speculated that out of the promethean optimism of western humanism
modern man had built for himself crystal palaces too_ cold and sterile
for human habitation.

Valery similarly imagined "an intellectual

Hamlet, meditating on the life and death of truths."
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By giving the name of progress to its mvn tendency to a fatal
precision, the world is seeking to add to the benefits of life the
advantages of death. A certain confusion still reigns; but in a
little while all will be made clear, and we shall witness at last
the mirag~e of an animal society, the perfect and ultimate
anthill.
These words expressed Valery's judgment, if not yet history's last
final verdict, on the corrosive effects of the Cartesian world-view, a
view to which Valery subscribed.

His aim was to show what the mind "has

made of the world and how, in particular, it has produced modern
society, in which order and disorder, equally and for the same reason,
are its handiwork." 65
"Cogito, ergo sum."
discovered a dilemma.
society?

Rene Descartes had begun with the premise,
Valery carried this thought to its extreme and
Starting with the self, how does one arrive at

Or vice versa?

On the one hand, the mind is opposed to the mass: it wants to be
itself, and even to extend, endlessly, the domain in which the self
is master. On the other hand, it is forced to recognize society, a
world of wills and human hopes all limiting one another; and
sometimes it wag5s to perfect, at other times to destroy, the order
i t finds there.
This is the ancient dilemma of "the one and the many."
for the Christian, a consequence of the fall of man into sin.

It is also,
The
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typical response in western philosophy has been to reify, or
materialize, the dialectic of propositional thought.

Hence, we tend to

think dualistically: mind and matter, grace and nature, realism and
nominalism.

But by choosing, we impale ourselves on one or another horn

of the dilemma.
. . In the modern world the difference between the idea of man
proposed by science and philosophy and the idea of man implied in
our legislation and all our political, moral, or social no5tons, is
increasing. There is already an abyss between them. . . .
The difference persists.

The crisis of the mind depicted by Valery

was--and is--a crisis of confidence, which is to say, a crisis of faith.
He conceded as much: "Let me first say that the whole social structure
is founded on belief and trust.
psychological traits."
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All power is based on these

But belief in what?

Trust in whom?

. The growth . . . of the positivist mentality is undermining
the ancient foundations of society.
It must be acknowledged that our ruin has been hastened by the
greatest minds (Voltaire, for example). Even in the sciences the
task of criticism has proved singularly necessary and fruitful.
The greatest minds are always skeptical minds. Yet they do believe
in something; they believe in whatever makes them greater. This
was the case, for example, with Napoleon, who believed in his star,
that is, himself. Now, not to believe in the common beliefs ~s
6
obviously to believe in oneself, and often in oneself alone.
The idea of man implied by modern politics is a broken one.

The

God who created man in his own image man is replaced by a new idol, such
as Valery's notion of the intellect.
rationalist is the skeptic.

But the alter ego of the

By coveting a place on a pedestal or throne

of its own making, the intellect risks being toppled by its own
iconoclastic whims.

The rebel will not abide any god, not even himself.

If he despises a mere earthly domain and seeks dominion over all that
his mind surveys, he is apt to end up chasing phantoms in a frenzied
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dialectic, as Henri Bergson recognized.

70

The modern skeptic, in

denying his creaturehood, may fancy himself either a plaything of chance
or a ward of the state, but very often adopts both views. 71
But perhaps the claim to total freedom is a demand for total
contro1. 72

In his treatise on natural law, Heinrich Rommen asserts:

the doctrine of autonomy of human reason . . . led straight to an
extravagance of syllogistic reasoning, of deductively constructed
systems that served to regulate all legal institutions down to the
minutest detail: the civil law governing debts, property, the
family, and inherit~nces as well as constitutional and
international law.
By the time of Valery, the dream of reason had become so involuted in
its dialectic that little remained besides its paradoxes.

At each point

in its empire its strength was about equal to zero.
Valery could not see beyond this apparent chaos.

His was a vision

of an intellectually insolvent western civilization in the two decades
following the First World War: "· . . Our Hamlet of Europe is watching
millions of ghosts." 74

His contemporary, William Butler Yeats, who was

prone to mysticism, wrote: "Things fall apart: the center cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world. .

"75 Many concluded that

civilization had reached an impasse; the tree of knowledge had borne
evil fruit.

A general political and cultural run on the bank took place

in those years.
The moral of the tale is summed up in the title of a book by
Richard Weaver: "Ideas Have Consequences." 76

Valery's idea involved a

conflict between reason and the social order:
Thought has to develop, and it has to be preserved. It can advance
only by extremes, but it can endure only by means. Extreme order,
which is automatism, would be its ruin; 77treme disorder would
bring it even more quickly to the abyss.
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Elsewhere, Valery wrote that the ever tighter rational organization of
the world is making "the vagueness of vague things . . . more and more
obvious.n

78

He believed that the social, judicial, and political worlds

are essentially mythical worlds, the products of "a host of more or less
venerable sentiments that all oddly intermingle and combine.n 79
If we tried to apply, in the realm of politics, the ideas
about man which we find in the current doctrines of science, life
would probably become unbearable for most of us. There would be a
general revolt of feeling in the face of such strict application of
perfectly rational data. For it would end, in fact, by classifying
each individual, invading his personal life, sometimes 6illing or
8
mutilating certain degenerate or inferior types . . . .
Valery wanted to shut the gates against a diffusion of the
intellectual capital of Europe throughout the world.
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By contrast, a

contemporary of his, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, welcomed a dawning of
universal history: "The flag of humanity overshadows all the national
flags.

Mere distance no longer makes us act as foes and

belligerents."
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But he also observed that, as a consequence, all wars

were becoming civil wars or revolutions.

The machinery of war was

coming to be used more and more for internal purposes.

"It is a great

moment in the history of humankind when the energies of the race shift
from martial laws to civil emergency laws.

The armies enlisted against

territorial enemies are superseded or outstripped by armies enlisting
against nature.n 83

Society now had to contend with a new reality that

both divided and redefined it.

"This is a stage of human growth in

which common language and traditional values lose their grip on the
individual.

We see him falter."

Ideas have consequences.
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Paul Valery wrote as a person caught in

the transition from one idea of man to another, who had to endure what
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he thought would be unbearable but to which later generations have
become somewhat adjusted.

Richard Weaver's observations bears directly

on the checkered history of the subject at hand: the relationship
between church and state.

Equally applicable is Valery's observation

that all politics presupposes or implies a certain idea of man.

Apart

from what we may consider normal institutional rivalries, the historic
issue between church and state involves ultimate values, loyalties, and
obligations: what Valery, like Wittgenstein, considered vague things.
The question is simply this: what idea of man will prevail and who
will set the cultural agenda?

Despite the frequent vagueness of the

ideological justifications offered by each side, a "fatal precision"
often characterizes the points at issue so that otherwise minor
considerations become major tests of will.
in matters of faith and politics.
commitment to a point of view.

There are no neutral corners

Every choice is an act of faith and a

The way we address issues bears witness

to where we place our confidence.

This is just as true of institutional

decisions.

As Valery recognized, even the most brutal power is founded

on belief.

Church and state share a common language--the lingua franca

of faith--and must appeal to sources and symbols of power that are often
identical.

The bone of contention between them hinges on the issue of

sovereignty: Who makes the rules, when, where, and on what authority?
The nature of the issue is well stated by R. J. Rushdoony:
Must of the present concern about the trends of these times is
literally wasted on useless effort because those who guide the
activities cannot resolve, with the philosophical tools at hand to
them, the problem of authority. This is at the heart of the
problem of the proper function of government, the power to tax, to
conscript, to execute for crimes, and to wage warfare. The
question of authority is again basic to education, to religion, and
to the family. Where does authority rest, in democracy or in an
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elite, ~g the church or in some secular institution, in God or in
reason?
Our consideration of the relationship between church and state in
America will be directed toward an understanding of some of the
political conflicts generated as a consequence of maintaining an
institutional separation of church and state as independent spheres of
authority.
The Dynamics of the Problem
The dichotomy of church and state confronts us, initially and
finally, as a political problem.

It is a problem that began at a

specific place at a specific time in a specific political context: the
imperial reign of the Roman Caesars.

As one writer notes: "In ancient

times, as in primitive society today, there existed no problem of Church
and State, for the very good reason that no church, in the modern sense
of the word, existed."

86

While the issue between them has not troubled

all climes and all seasons equally, it looms large in the history of the
West.

Religion at one time served mainly as an accessory of statecraft.

The advent of Judaism and Christianity set new forces into motion that
freed religious energies from a preoccupation with parochial loyalties.
How the church--specifically the Christian Church--emerged independent
of the state and how the two have interacted since that time are the
subjects of this dissertation.
The problem may be explored in any of several dimensions.

The

political dimension may be brought into focus with a question: How can
two distinct institutions, similar or overlapping in composition, make
authoritative yet independent claims to the obedience and loyalty of
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their members?

The durability of the coexistence of church and state

may be regarded as a major catalyst in the development of western
political traditions.

Their rivalry in matters of jurisdiction often

prompted accommodations which have served as prototypes for subsequent
political innovations.

American federalism, for example, owes many of

its essential features to Puritan political experiments in colonial New
England.

Various constitutional liberties and concepts of limited

government derived much of their original impetus from struggles for
religious freedom.
This suggests another question: What circumstances permitted such a
conflict of authority to be resolved by limiting the jurisdiction of the
state?

The ingredients for an understanding are stored in the

laboratory of history.

Issues raised during earlier religious

controversies provide a basis for analyzing current disputes.

Early

Christians and Jews challenged the state cult of imperial Rome by
refusing obeisance to Caesar as their lord or master.

Both groups

sought immunity from the religious laws and had to endure periods of
official persecution while defending their distinct identity and way of
life.
A third dimension, the ideological, is arguably the most important
to a recognition of what is at stake on both sides.

It involves a

different question: How is it possible to establish and maintain a
political consensus without bringing all authority under one sovereign
head?

Differing perceptions of sovereignty, law, and citizenship may,

after all, indicate seriously divided loyalties.

Where social

institutions fall out of step with each other and unifying traditions
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are weakened, even ordinary stresses may threaten political disruption
and demoralization.

The ability of a society to face change and

conflict with unity and equanimity is a measure of its moral health.
Common values and a common political agenda are generally preferred as a
society's first line of defense.

Normally this means an assimilation of

all groups and traditions to some existing or purposely devised set of
norms.

This function is usually filled by a civil religion.

It is sometimes objected that the relationship between church and
state is not characteristically political and, compared with earlier
eras, is no longer a matter of particular concern in a modern secular
society.

The contemporary American church--if it may be described in

the singular--does not press a distinctly political claim.

Its

ordinances are not comparable in nature or force to those of the state.
Moreover, people expect that questions of faith today be left to the
private dictates of individual consciences.

The church that addresses

political issues or otherwise imposes its separate will overreaches
these customary limits at its own peril.
While this point may be conceded in part, it fails to consider the
dynamic nature of religion, particularly Christianity.

Changes in

political circumstances or religious priorities may redefine, even
shatter, any existing accommodation between church and state.

American

political institutions have long operated on the basis of shared moral
values and assumptions that derive in large part from the Bible and
Christianity. 87

It is worth considering whether and how well such

institutions can work under a deliberately secular, pluralistic regime.
In the absence of a common moral ground that can help channel conflict,
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secular or religious militancy may stir up fear and reaction.

The

volume of current legislation and litigation concerning religious issues
is a sign of growing dissension over the proper role of the state in
religion and the church in public life.
As to whether this is a political question, then, the objection may
be met very simply: any association between church and state is
unavoidably political.

On the one hand, the state values religion--at

least in the generic sense--as a means of upholding an ideological
consensus and encouraging civil peace.

On the other hand, the Christian

Church is historically called to acknowledge "one Lord, one faith, one
baptism" (Eph. 4:5): which is to say, one citizenship in which all final
authority is vested in a sovereign God.

Such a claim is treasonable if

the state--if Caesar--is rightfully sovereign.
issue is joined.

Here, as always, the

It is a suitable point of departure for a historical

study of the problem.
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